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BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT WILL NOT REPEAL 
LONG-STANDING RULES CONCERNING MORTGAGE 
FORECLOSURE. 
The primary thrust of the Respondents' petition for 
rehearing is that the court's decision will inexorably repeal 
a long-standing rule of the court that the mortgagor or his 
grantee is entitled to the use of the mortgaged property until 
the sheriff's sale is final. The Respondents are obviously 
referring to the court's statement that the Clawsons' title 
was defunct, and that it could not be revitalized by any 
redemption by Spaulding. > 
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It is the law that a mortgage foreclosure extin-
guishes all interests inferior to that of the mortgage fore-
closed and, in deed, the judgment of foreclosure in the 
present case expressly stated that the Clawsons lost all 
interest and title to the property in question. This same 
point was brought out in Appellants' Brief at pp. 5 through 10. 
An additional authority expressing the same rule in express 
terms is the follows: 
A judgment or decree of foreclosure con-
cludes the rights of a claimant under a 
legal title adverse to that of the mort-
gagor and mortgagee where such rights were 
properly made the subject of adjudication 
in the foreclosure proceeding. 59 C.J.S. 
Mortgages §704(d). 
To rephrase the question that has apparently caused 
so much consternation among the Respondents, "What then becomes 
of the title to the property between the time of sale and 
the time of redemption?" The answer to that question will 
not repeal any long-standing rule of law in the State of Utah. 
On the contrary, it is stated succinctly at 59 C.J.S. Mortgages 
§520 (1949). 
A completed foreclosure divests the mort-
gagor's title to the mortgaged premises 
and vests it in the mortgagee or purchaser. 
A footnote to that same section clarifies the situation even 
further. 59 C.J.S., supra, 849-50 n.62, recites the holding 
of In Re Nelson: 
Mortgage foreclosure sale and sheriff's 
certificate of sale extinguished all of > 
mortgagor's property in realty involved, 
except bare legal title with statutory 
rights of possession and redemption. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Between the time of judgment and the time of redemp-
tion, then, the property is in the custody of the court with 
certain statutory rights resting in the mortgagor or his 
grantee (possession, redemption), and with certain statutory 
rights resting in the mortgagee or purchaser (sale, redemption, 
elimination of all inferior interests, equitable title). 
The court's decision in this case will not overrule 
the long-standing principle that: 
The landowner's title and right to possession, 
use and benefit of property sold on mort-
gage foreclosure or execution sale is re-
served to him during the redemption period 
and until the sheriff's deed. (Res. Petition 
for Rehearing and Brief in Support Thereof, 
p. 1) 
The court's decision does not repeal any long-stand-
ing rules concerning mortgage foreclosure. The elements of 
title remain divided, as stated, and the property rests in 
the custody of the court pending disposition. 
POINT II 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT WAS MADE ON THE 
BASIS OF A THEORY PROPERLY SUBMITTED BEFORE 
THE COURT IN BOTH BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT, 
AND A REHEARING CANNOT BE GRANTED MERELY 
TO ALLOW RESPONDENTS THE LUXURY OF FILING 
ADDITIONAL BRIEFS AND RE-ARGUING POINTS 
ALREADY ARGUED AND ADJUDGED. 
As pointed out above, Point I of Appellants' Brief 
goes directly to the question of the vitality of the Clawsons' 
defunct claim. The matter has already been submitted to the 
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court in both brief and oral form. Appellants' Brief devotes 
five pages to the defunct nature of the Clawsons1 claim, and 
Appellants were, careful to point out in oral argument that the 
foreclosure judgment expressly extinguished all claims or interests 
of the Clawsons. The fact that Respondents chose not to address 
themselves to that question in their brief does not entitle them 
to a rehearing at this time for the purpose of re-arguing a 
matter already submitted, or for filing an additional brief. 
The law is clear that a rehearing will not be ordered so that 
one party can re-argue an issue already submitted to the court. 
It is stated at 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §1411 (1958): 
If no omissions or new authorities or points 
of law or fact are shown, the appellate court 
will seldom permit a rehearing simply for the 
purpose of obtaining a re-argument on, and a 
reconsideration of, points, authorities and 
matters which have already been fully considered 
by the court, on the assertion of counsel that, 
notwithstanding the court fully considered every-
thing wished to be urged on the rehearing, it 
reached the wrong conclusion. Id. 540. 
In the present case the Respondents are arguing no new 
facts, and the great majority of the cases cited by them have 
already been cited by the parties hereto in their respective briefs. 
The only new cases cited by the Respondents are the Carlquist, 
Layton and Local Realty cases, and all of those cases simply 
restate hornbook law on redemption. The cases are inapplicable 
to the question before the court. For the same reason it. is also 
held that 
. . .a rehearing will not be granted. . . ,. 
to enable. . .additional briefs to be filed. . . . 
Id. 541. 
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The cases in support of this point are numerous, and 
several from this region are worthy of note. In Phelps Dodge 
Corporation v.,Industrial Commission, 90 Ariz. 379, 368 P.2d 450 
(1962), the court stated: 
A rehearing is not granted to re-argue 
matters determined by the decision. 
/Citations omitted^/ Id. 452. 
In Climate Control, Inc., v. Hill, 87 Ariz. 201, 349 
P.2d 771 (1960), the court stated: 
Finally, Appellant has advanced other 
grounds for reversing this court's 
decision. They consist primarily of 
a re-argument of its initial position. 
By long-established rule of court they 
are not grounds for reconsideration. 
/Citation omitted./ Id. 773. 
In Town of Glenrock v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway 
Company, 73 Wyo. 395, 281 P.2d 455 (1955), the court stated: 
This court has previously pointed out 
that when the reason advanced for a re-
hearing is simply re-argument and repetition 
of counsel's views which have already re-
ceived consideration, we_will decline to __ 
re-travel those paths. /Citation omitted^/ 
Id. 456. 
And, in London Guaranty and Accident Company v. Officer, 
78 Colo. 441, 242 P. 989 (1926), the court apparently became 
quite aggravated with the petitioner in a similar situation: 
In addition thereto, that portion of the appli-
cation contains nothing new, but is a mere re-
argument of the questions as heretofore pre-
sented. It is, therefore, a gross violation 
of the rule of this court, and, in addition, 
is so discourteous as to merit at least the 
disposition now made of it. The application 
is stricken from the files. Rehearing is > 
denied. Id. 995. 
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It has previously been pointed out that Appellants 
devoted five pages of their Brief to the question now raised' 
by. Respondents, and it has also been pointed out that Respon-
dents chose to respond only peripherally to that issue, at 
p. 18 of their Brief. Respondents now apparently wish to 
re-argue that point and to file a brief of authorities relative 
thereto. This cannot be done. 
Ordinarily a rehearing will not be granted 
merely because of the failure of counsel 
sufficiently to present the cause for the 
determination of the appellate court. -
Accordingly, all points relied on must be 
presented originally, rather than reserved 
to be urged on the court in the event of 
an adverse decision, and a rehearing will 
not be granted because of the petitioner's 
failure to argue or present important 
points on hearing. . . . 5 C.J.S. Appeal 
and Error §1417, 545 (1958). 
It has been held on several occasions and in several 
jurisdictions that a rehearing will not be ordered merely to 
allow additional argument on the issues originally presented 
to the court. In Rice v. Bennington County Savings Bank, 
93 Vt. 493, 108 A. 708 (1920), it was stated: 
Moreover, it is a general rule that 
failure to present a case fully or to 
give sufficient attention to the argu-
ment on a former hearing does not, in 
a court of last resort, afford ground 
for granting a new trial. Id. 716. 
In New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Luddeke, 72 S.W.2d 942 
(Tex.Civ.App., 1934), the Texas court has explained quite 
concisely why a petitioner will not be allowed to cure the 
defects of his original brief through a rehearing. 
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The defects in and omissions from Appellant's 
brief, and pointed out in the original opinion, 
are sought to be cured and supplied in the 
motion for rehearing* But that effort comes 
too late. Parties are bound by and restricted 
to presentation in their briefs. Any other 
rule would result in disorder, confusion, 
delays, the disruption of orderly procedure 
in this court. This is to£ obvious to require 
argument to support it. /citations omitted/ 
Id. 944. 
The question raised by Respondents has already 
been heard and adjudged by this court, and Respondents cannot 
now request a rehearing for the purpose of re-arguing that 
same question in slightly altered form. 
POINT III 
A REHEARING CANNOT BE GRANTED MERELY BECAUSE 
THE QUESTION IS IMPORTANT. 
Respondents are mistaken when they point to the 
supposedly awesome ramifications of the court's decision in 
this case. Respondents state: 
But to characterize Clawsons' claim as 
defunct would unintentionally obliterate 
a fundamental right which has been es-
tablished for many years in this state: 
the right to possession, use and the rents 
and profits of the mortgaged estate, during 
the period of redemption. (Res. Brief in 
Support of Rehearing, p.2.) 
Simply stated, Respondents are wrong. It has pre-
viously been pointed out that no rights will be obliterated. 
The title to the property becomes divided upon judgment of 
foreclosure, with only the barest legal title remaining in 
the mortgagor. The equitable title to the property vests in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the court pending disposition of the property and finally comes 
to rest in the mortgagee, redemptioner or purchaser at sale. 
As stated in In Re Nelson, supra, no rights of the mortgagor 
or his grantees are "obliterated". The rights are created by 
statute and they remain viable. 
However, even were this question to hold the unassail-
able significance which Respondents apparently attribute to it, 
such would not be grounds for rehearing. It is stated at 
5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error, §1418 (1958): 
A rehearing ordinarily will not be granted 
because the question is of great importance, 
unless it appears to have been decided 
without due consideration. 
The court's decision in the present case was proper, 
and it is obvious from the briefs, oral argument, and the opinion 
of this court that this question was given due consideration. 
POINT IV 
A REHEARING CANNOT BE GRANTED MERELY BECAUSE THE 
COURT'S DECISION APPEARS TO BE OUT OF HARMONY WITH 
PRIOR DECISIONS OF THE COURT. 
It must first be stated that the opinion of this court 
is not out of harmony with prior decisions made by this court. 
Respondents are attempting to twist a few words of this cdurt's 
decision into a total reversal of the Utah mortgage law. The 
court's decision will not alter the statutory right to possession 
during the redemption period, and Respondents' argument is simply 
a pretext for requesting a chance to re-argue the same issues. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 9 -
Those cases cited by Respondents apply only to the statutory. 
right of redemption and are only peripherally related to the 
question now. before the court. It is clear that the present 
case can be easily distinguished from the cases on which 
Respondents rest. Consequently, a rehearing cannot be granted. 
A rehearing will not be granted on the 
ground that the decision of the appellate 
court is out of harmony with certain for-
mer decisions cited in the rehearing peti-
tion where such former decisions do not 
justify a ruling different from that 
rendered, or are substantially distin-
guishable. 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error, 
§1424 (1958). 
The court's decision in the present case is not 
out of harmony with its former decisions as cited by Respondents 
for the reason that this case is substantially distinguishable 
from the cases cited. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents' concern that the court's decision in 
this matter will completely reverse the present Utah mortgage 
law is unwarranted. The mortgagor's right to the use and 
possession of the foreclosed property during the redemption 
period is a right created by statute (In Re Nelson, supra), 
and has not been affected by this decision. If Respondents 
were really so concerned about this particular aspect of the 
problem, they should have addressed the point either in their 
Brief or in oral argument. The court addressed itself to the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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question at that time and has now made its decision. The 
fact that Respondents failed to address themselves to that 
question prior to this time does not justify a rehearing, 
nor can a rehearing be granted merely because Respondents 
feel the question is important — not in view of the fact 
that the Supreme Court has already duly deliberated the 
question and has reached its decision. 
It is not grounds for rehearing, either, that the 
court's decision may be out of harmony with certain former 
decisions, especially in light of the fact that this case 
is substantially distinguishable from the other cases cited 
by Respondents. 
A rehearing is inappropriate in this case and the 
petition of the Respondents must be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Kay M. Lewis 
JENSEN & LEWIS 
320 South 300 East, Suite 1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents 
.jh 
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